UA-69458566-1

Wednesday, March 27, 2024

Iran Update, March 27, 2024

 Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Alexandra Braverman, and Nicholas Carl

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to subscribe to the Iran Update.

Key Takeaways:

  • Northern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Palestinian militias have conducted nearly 70 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around the hospital since Israeli forces returned to the area on March 18.
  • Southern Gaza Strip: Israeli forces discovered a “significant” tunnel network in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.
  • Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is planning to send two top officials to Washington to discuss a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.
  • Political Negotiations: Three unspecified people familiar with the Israel-Hamas negotiations told CNN that ceasefire talks have reached another stalemate but are continuing.
  • West Bank: The IDF said that it conducted a “counterterrorism” operation around Jenin, highlighting the enduring militia network that exists there.
  • Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights: The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike in southern Lebanon, killing at least seven fighters associated with the military wing of a Lebanese Islamist political party Jamaa al Islamiyya.
  • Iraq: Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi threatened to resume attacks targeting US forces if they do not leave Iraq.
  • The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israeli military infrastructure.
  • Yemen: Senior IRGC Quds Force officer Brig. Gen. Abdol Reza Shahlai directed the initial Houthi attacks targeting vessels around the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea in October 2023, according to Bloomberg, further underscoring the Iranian role in these attacks.
  • Iran: Senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leaders continued their visit to Tehran.



Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
  • Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip.

Israeli forces continued operating in and around al Shifa Hospital in Gaza City on March 27.[1] Israeli forces killed dozens of Palestinian fighters and located unspecified military infrastructure and weapons in the hospital area.[2] Israeli Army Radio reported that the IDF surrounded three buildings in the hospital compound, where approximately 30 senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) personnel are located.[3] The IDF published footage on March 26 of its forces questioning a PIJ fighter, who said that Hamas and PIJ personnel are “scattered in the buildings” at al Shifa Hospital.[4] The IDF published an infographic of three Hamas and PIJ officials detained at the hospital, including a leader in Hamas’ Security and Protection Department.[5]

Most of the Palestinian militia attacks on March 27 targeted Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital.[6] Palestinian militias have conducted nearly 70 attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around the hospital since Israeli forces returned to the area on March 18. This high rate of attack indicates that Palestinian militias retain a significant degree of combat effectiveness in the area, despite continued Israeli clearing efforts around Gaza City. At least six Palestinian militias have participated in the recent attacks targeting Israeli forces in and around al Shifa Hospital.

A Palestinian journalist reported on March 27 that Israeli forces advanced into parts of Zaytoun neighborhood in southwestern Gaza City.[7] The IDF concluded a two-week-long re-clearing of Zaytoun on March 3.[8] The return of Israeli forces to the neighborhood suggests that Palestinian militias continue to operate there similar to how these militias still have a presence in other portions of the northern Gaza Strip.



The IDF Nahal Brigade (162nd Division) continued clearing operations in the central Gaza Strip on March 27.[9] A Palestinian journalist reported that Israeli forces advanced into unspecified areas east of Bureij.[10] Hamas claimed that its fighters mortared Israeli forces in the area.[11]

The IDF reported on March 27 that Israeli forces discovered a “significant” tunnel network in al Amal neighborhood in western Khan Younis.[12] The IDF said that it used intelligence from questioning detained Palestinian fighters to find three tunnel shafts. The IDF has been conducting a second round of clearing operations in al Amal neighborhood, western Khan Younis, since March 24.[13]

The IDF continued clearing operations in Qarara in northern Khan Younis on March 27.[14]

The IDF published on March 27 footage of an airstrike targeting a Palestinian fighter, who was surveilling Israeli forces in Hamad neighborhood, northern Khan Younis.[15] The IDF said that the fighter was passing information on Israeli troop locations to other Palestinian fighters over a phone.




Unspecified US and Israeli officials told Axios that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is planning to send two top officials to Washington to discuss a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah.[16] The Israeli officials are expected to arrive as early as next week. Netanyahu canceled a planned visit of two top Israeli security officials to Washington, DC, on March 25 in response to the United States’ abstention from the UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire. Netanyahu said in a statement on March 27 that his reasoning for canceling the Israeli visit was “a message to Hamas: Don’t bet on this pressure, it’s not going to work.”[17] The White House said on March 27 that the Israeli Prime Minister's Office had agreed to reschedule the meeting.[18] Axios reported that Netanyahu is expected to send the Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer and National Security Adviser Tzachi Hanegbi.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant discussed a possible Israeli clearing operation into Rafah in a meeting with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin on March 26.[19] Gallant arrived in Washington, DC, on March 25 to meet with top US diplomatic and military officials. An unnamed senior US Department of Defense official stated that Austin presented to Gallant the broad outlines of the Biden administration’s ”alternative approach” to an Israeli operation into Rafah.[20] This approach included Israel targeting Hamas leadership, creating a plan to evacuate civilians, increasing humanitarian aid into the area, and securing the Gazan-Egyptian border.[21] The official also stated that the Israelis were receptive to these outlines. Gallant told reporters after the meeting that Israel needs “to destroy Hamas as a military and governing organization in Gaza.”[22] He also said that they discussed the issue of aid distribution in the Gaza Strip and noted that Hamas is “sabotag[ing] the delivery of aid.”[23] Unspecified US officials said the two discussed the United States selling F-15 and F-35 fighter jets and Apache helicopter gunships to Israel.[24]

Three unspecified people familiar with the Israel-Hamas negotiations told CNN that ceasefire talks have reached another stalemate but are continuing.[25] An unnamed senior Israeli official familiar with the negotiations in Doha told Israeli media said that Hamas’ response to the latest hostage deal offer was “ridiculous” and that Hamas’ leader in the Gaza Strip, Yahya Sinwar, “does not want to move forward with a deal at the moment.”[26] Lebanese media cited unnamed Egyptian sources, who have been in contact with IDF officials, saying that, following the failure of the latest round of negotiations, Israel is unwilling to make any further concessions to Hamas and is preparing for a clearing operation into Rafah after Eid al Fitr or in early May at the latest.[27]

Hamas published on March 27 a video statement of its military commander Mohammad Deif calling for popular marches toward Israel and the Palestinian Territories.[28] Deif stated: “Begin marching now, not tomorrow, toward Palestine, and do not let restrictions, borders, or regulations deprive you of the honor of participating in the liberation of al Aqsa Mosque.”

Israeli media reported on March 27, citing an unspecified Israeli official, that 25 aid trucks reached the northern Gaza Strip without incident.[29] The trucks entered the Gaza Strip through Gate 96, which Israel reportedly opened in early March 2024.[30]

PIJ conducted an indirect fire attack from the Gaza Strip targeting Kissufim in southern Israel on March 27.[31] The IDF acknowledged that the rocket fell in an open area.[32] The IDF Air Force struck the area from which the Palestinian fighters launched the rockets and killed those responsible.


Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Israeli forces have engaged Palestinian fighters in at least nine locations in the West Bank since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 26.[33]

The IDF said that it conducted a “counterterrorism” operation around Jenin on March 27, highlighting the enduring militia network that exists there.[34] The IDF conducted a drone strike during the operation, killing two Palestinian fighters.[35] Israeli forces killed a third Palestinian fighter, who threw IEDs targeting Israeli forces.[36] The IDF also said that it detained two Palestinians, who were driving a vehicle carrying “ready-to-use explosives.”[37] CTP-ISW previously assessed that PIJ and possibly other Palestinian militias have a cell in Jenin for targeting Israeli civilians outside the West Bank.[38]

An Israeli Army Radio journalist reported on March 27 that the IDF will turn the Netzah Yehuda Battalion into a maneuver infantry battalion.[39] The Netzah Yehuda Battalion is an ultra-Orthodox military unit that operates primarily in the West Bank.[40] The journalist said that the battalion will train to conduct maneuver in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.[41] Israeli media reported that some soldiers from the Netzah Yehuda Battalion began operating in the Gaza Strip in January 2024.[42] The Israeli government must present legislation aimed at increasing recruitment among the religious community by the end of March, but it has disagreed over drafting ultra-Orthodox Israelis.[43]


This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
  • Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Lebanese Hezbollah has conducted at least six attacks from southern Lebanon into northern Israel since CTP-ISW's last data cutoff on March 26.[44] Hezbollah fired approximately 30 rockets targeting IDF forces in Kiryat Shmona in northern Israel, killing one Israeli civilian and damaging buildings.[45]

The IDF Air Force conducted an airstrike in southern Lebanon on March 27, killing at least seven fighters associated with the military wing of a Lebanese Islamist political party Jamaa al Islamiyya .[46] The IDF and Israeli media reported that the fighters had plotted to infiltrate Shebaa Farms.[47]

Senior Hezbollah official Nawaf al Mousawi said that Hezbollah has increased the rate at which it can stockpile new weapons during an interview with Hezbollah-affiliated media on March 26.[48] Mousawi, who serves as the head of Hezbollah’s Borders and Natural Resources Department, said that the group is now capable of receiving as many weapons in a month as it previously received in six months.[49] Mousawi added that Hezbollah has created new storage facilities and has acquired more accurate missiles for ”naval, ground, and aerial use.” Israel has conducted an air campaign into Syria in recent months to disrupt Iranian efforts to transfer military materiel to Hezbollah. Mousawi also said that Israel is facing logistical challenges and would not be able to strike Lebanon or the Gaza Strip if not for US weapons shipments.[50]

The IDF approved a new training program to increase the Air Force’s readiness around northern Israel.[51] The IDF said that the Air Force has conducted military training exercises over recent weeks.[52] The exercises include "massive, long-range strikes, flights deep in enemy territory, decision-making in war conditions. . . and surprise exercises will be held for the various units."[53] The IDF said that the training will not interrupt the Air Forces’ operations in the Gaza Strip or other areas.


Recorded reports of attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

  • Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
  • Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq claimed on March 26 that unidentified actors conducted a drone attack targeting US forces at Conoco Mission Support Site in eastern Syria.[54] The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights similarly reported that US forces intercepted a drone in the area on March 26.[55] CTP-ISW cannot verify whether any attack occurred, however.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance remains committed to expelling the United States from the Middle East—by force is necessary—regardless of whether the reported attack on March 26 occurred. CTP-ISW has previously warned that the current lull in Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks does not indicate a change in the long-term Iranian and Iranian-backed effort to force the United States from the region.[56] Iranian-backed Iraqi militias retain the capability to resume attacks targeting US forces at any time and for any reason of their choosing.

Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq Secretary General Mohammad al Tamimi threatened during a Newsweek interview published on March 27 to resume attacks targeting US forces if they do not leave Iraq.[57]Tamimi threatened that Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq will target and kill US service members “if an agreement is not achieved” between Baghdad and Washington. Tamimi was referring to ongoing discussions between the United States and Iraq to transition to a bilateral security partnership.[58]  Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq has reported ties to Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Asaib Ahl al Haq and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba.[59] Faylaq al Waad al Sadiq also proclaims to adhere to Velayat-e Faqih, which is a core tenet of Iranian governance that enshrines the position of a senior cleric at the head of the regime.[60]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed two attacks targeting Israeli military infrastructure on March 26.[61] The group claimed to target the Sapir military facility on the Sea of Galilee, northern Israel, with one-way attack drones and Ovda Airbase in Eilat, southern Israel, with unspecified munitions. CTP-ISW has previously observed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has transitioned to conducting regular attacks targeting Israel in March 2024 rather than US forces in Iraq and Syria.[62] The group has not claimed any attacks targeting US forces since February 4.[63]

US Department of Defense Deputy Press Secretary Sabrina Singh confirmed that the United States was not responsible for a series of airstrikes on March 25 that targeted Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and IRGC-affiliated positions in eastern Syria.[64] CTP-ISW previously noted that Israel was likely responsible for the strike.[65]

Senior IRGC Quds Force officer Brig. Gen. Abdol Reza Shahlai directed the initial Houthi attacks targeting vessels around the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea in October 2023, according to Bloomberg, further underscoring the Iranian role in these attacks.[66] Bloomberg cited informed sources. Shahlai’s involvement reflects the prominent role that Iran has had in directing and supporting the Houthi attack campaign targeting commercial and military vessels off the coast of Yemen. CTP-ISW has previously noted the Iranian role in providing targeting intelligence to the Houthis.[67]

Shahlai is the seniormost IRGC Quds Force responsible for the Yemen portfolio but also has an extensive background coordinating other clandestine Iranian activities globally.[68] Shahlai has helped arm and fund Iranian-backed Iraqi militias and supported their attacks targeting US and coalition forces in Iraq. Shahlai planned, for instance, an attack that killed five US services members and wounded three others in Karbala in 2007.[69] He also directed and funded the attempted assassination of the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States in Washington, DC, in 2011.[70] The United States attempted to kill Shahlai the same evening as the US airstrike that killed IRGC Quds Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani in January 2020.[71] The US Treasury Department designated Shahlai as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2011.[72]

Senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) leaders continued their visit to Tehran on March 27. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh and PIJ Secretary General Ziyad al Nakhalah separately traveled to Tehran on March 26.[73] Haniyeh met with Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian on March 26.[74] Haniyeh also presented a report on “current events and prospects” in the Gaza Strip during a meeting with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi on March 27.[75] The Hamas readout of Haniyeh and Raisi’s meeting noted that the two officials discussed the "conditions” facing Palestinians in Jerusalem and the West Bank.[76] Haniyeh’s visit to Tehran marks his second trip to Iran since the Israel-Hamas war began.[77]

Iranian media has notably published no reports about meetings between Nakhalah and Iranian officials. Nakhalah has almost certainly engaged Iranian officials since arriving in Tehran or will do so before he leaves. The lack of relevant media coverage is bizarre, especially given the opportunity for the Iranian regime to broadcast publicly its support for the Palestinian militias by having state media cover Nakhalah’s visit. The media silence could indicate that Nakhalah is holding meetings with officials that the Iranian regime does not wish to publicize.

IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brig. Gen. Mohammad Pak Pour visited IRGC Ground Forces units in southeastern Iran on March 27.[78] It is unclear which units Pak Pour visited, although the IRGC Ground Forces has at least four brigades in the southeastern region.[79] Pak Pour’s visit comes amid an uptick in anti-regime militancy in southeastern Iran since December 2023. Jaish al Adl—a Balochi, Salafi-jihadi group operating around the Iran-Pakistan border—has conducted at least five attacks targeting Iranian security personnel since December 2023.[80] The Afghan branch of the Islamic State separately conducted a terrorist attack in Kerman Province in early January 2024, killing over 90 individuals.[81]

 


[1] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772882307612803335

[2] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772882310066552914

[3] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1772868185852621231

[4] https://twitter.com/IDF/status/1772656672030253187/video/1

[5] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772693417971048953

[6] https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6147

; https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1827

; https://t.me/sarayaps/17604

; https://t.me/khalaya_almujahidin/14582

; https://t.me/AymanGouda/6103

[7] https://twitter.com/ytirawi/status/1772961247857717403

[8] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-3-2024

[9] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772882355260186816

[10] https://twitter.com/ytirawi/status/1772961247857717403

[11] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1829

[12] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772882350197666089; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1772995676634325025

[13] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1771941578350658040 ; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1771941580384981235

[14] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772882350197666089

[15] https://www.idf dot il/188175

[16] https://www.axios.com/2024/03/27/netanyahu-biden-delegation-rafah-reversal

[17] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/netanyahu-insists-cancellation-of-aides-us-trip-after-un-vote-a-message-to-hamas/

[18] https://www.axios.com/2024/03/27/netanyahu-biden-delegation-rafah-reversal

[19] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3719161/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iiis-meeting-with-israeli-minist/

[20] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/26/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#biden-netanyahu-gallant

[21] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/26/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#biden-netanyahu-gallant

[22] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/26/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#biden-netanyahu-gallant

[23] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/26/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#biden-netanyahu-gallant

[24] https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/03/26/world/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news#biden-netanyahu-gallant

[25] https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/27/politics/israel-hamas-ceasefire-talks-stuck/index.html

[26] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/senior-israeli-official-hamas-demands-ridiculous-sinwar-not-looking-for-truce-deal/

[27] https://www.al-akhbar dot com/Palestine/379195/الاحتلال-يلو-ح-بدخول-رفح-بعد-عيد-الفط; https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/report-israel-preparing-for-rafah-ground-operation-in-mid-april-or-early-may/

[28] https://t.me/qassam1brigades/1828

[29] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/liveblog_entry/israel-says-25-aid-trucks-reached-north-gaza-during-night/

[30] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/destruction-lawlessness-red-tape-hobble-aid-gazans-go-hungry-2024-03-25/

[31] https://t.me/sarayaps/17607

[32] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1773029468099039699

[33] https://t.me/jeninqassamm/5284; https://t.me/jeninqassamm/5285; https://t.me/jeninqassamm/5289; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6139; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6138; https://t.me/jeninqassamm/5357; https://t.me/jeninqassamm/5400; https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772913206207418584; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6141; https://t.me/elaqsa_1965/6143; https://t.me/kataebaqsapalestine/3116

[34] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772913206207418584

[35] https://www.timesofisrael dot com/three-palestinians-killed-by-israeli-troops-in-jenin-drone-strike-heavy-clashes/

[36] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772913208862331337

[37] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772913206207418584

[38] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-21-2024

[39] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1772892252248895787

[40] https://www.wsj.com/articles/ultra-orthodox-israeli-military-unit-faces-calls-to-disband-after-abuse-allegations-11667216660

[41] https://twitter.com/Doron_Kadosh/status/1772892252248895787

[42] https://www.jpost dot com/israel-hamas-war/article-781243

[43] https://apnews.com/article/israel-military-gaza-netanyahu-religion-b91733c886246e2c69ca525f71c78053

[44] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772964098629599388; https://t.me/mmirleb/2883; https://t.me/mmirleb/2885; https://t.me/mmirleb/2887; https://t.me/mmirleb/2889; https://t.me/mmirleb/2891

[45] https://t.me/mmirleb/2883; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1772896344530641005; https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1772886887490834862; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1772880402400624848

[46] https://twitter.com/idfonline/status/1772859093746626886; https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1772992596463243678

[47] https://twitter.com/GLZRadio/status/1772990438791667879; https://www.maariv dot co.il/news/military/Article-1087222

[48] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/03/26/hezbollah-claims-it-has-six-fold-increase-in-speed-of-weapons-delivery/; https://english.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/hezbollah-will-not-abandon-people-of-gaza-regardless--senior

[49] https://english.almayadeen dot net/news/politics/hezbollah-will-not-abandon-people-of-gaza-regardless--senior

[50] https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_eds/2024/03/26/hezbollah-claims-it-has-six-fold-increase-in-speed-of-weapons-delivery/;

[51] https://www.idf dot il/188197

[52] https://twitter.com/manniefabian/status/1772986935864099019

[53] https://www.idf dot il/188197

[54] https://t.me/Alwaadalsadeq3/548 

[55] https://www.syriahr.com/en/329325/  

[56] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-22-2024

[57] https://www.newsweek.com/exclusiveiraq-militia-warns-us-troops-will-exit-coffins-if-biden-wont-withdraw-1883807

[58] https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3655790/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-on-the-start-of-working-gr/ ; https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3487344/us-iraq-joint-security-cooperation-dialogue-joint-statement/

[59] https://jihadology dot net/2014/01/13/hizballah-cavalcade-faylak-waad-al-sadiq-the-repackaging-of-an-iraqi-special-group-for-syria/

[60] https://jihadology dot net/2014/01/13/hizballah-cavalcade-faylak-waad-al-sadiq-the-repackaging-of-an-iraqi-special-group-for-syria/

[61] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1002 ; https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/1003

[62] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-march-7-2024

[63] https://t.me/ElamAlmoqawama/954

[64] https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3719422/deputy-pentagon-press-secretary-ms-sabrina-singh-holds-a-press-briefing/

[65] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-march-26-2024

[66] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2024-03-27/the-us-no-fail-mission-to-protect-the-red-sea-isn-t-working

[67] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-february-22-2024

[68] https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/abdul-reza-shahlai/ ; https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdul-reza-shahlai

[69] https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/abdul-reza-shahlai/

[70] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1320#:~:text=planning%20this%20operation.-,Abdul%20Reza%20Shahlai,States%20and%20in%20another%20country. ; https://rewardsforjustice.net/rewards/abdul-reza-shahlai/

[71] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/on-the-day-us-forces-killed-soleimani-they-launched-another-secret-operation-targeting-a-senior-iranian-official-in-yemen/2020/01/10/60f86dbc-3245-11ea-898f-eb846b7e9feb_story.html

[72] https://ofac.treasury.gov/recent-actions/20111011

[73] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/07/3059533/ ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/07/3059743/ ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/07/3059731/

[74] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/07/3059533/ ;

https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/07/3059743/ ;

[75] https://president dot ir/fa/150856

[76] https://t.me/hamasps/19861

[77] https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/hamas-leader-haniyeh-travel-tehran-meetings-with-iranian-officials-press-tv-2024-03-26/

[78] https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1403/01/08/3059908; https://defapress dot ir/fa/news/658604/

[79] https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Irans-Reserve-of-Last-Resort.pdf?x85095

[80] https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-15-2023; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-december-19-2023; https://t.me/mediaadl/311; https://t.me/mediaadl/313; https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-update-january-17-2024 ; https://www.tasnimnews dot com/fa/news/1402/10/27/3024909/ ; https://t.me/mediaadl/317

[81] https://apnews.com/article/iran-bombing-ringleader-tajikistan-4dec3cf4b1479a0222b2853bbb2f72bb

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 27, 2024

 Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, and Frederick W. Kagan

March 27, 2024, 5:10pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:15pm ET on March 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the March 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) released its 38th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine on March 26, confirming several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about Russia’s systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied territories and towards Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).[1] The HRMMU report details activities between December 1, 2023 and February 29 2024, and includes new findings about Russia’s abuse of Ukrainian POWs during this timeframe, based on interviews with 60 recently released male POWs.[2] Nearly all of the POWs that HRMMU interviewed detailed how they were tortured by Russian forces with beatings and electric shocks and threatened with execution, and over half of the interviewees experienced sexual violence. HRMMU also reported that it has evidence of Russian forces executing at least 32 POWs in 12 different incidents during the reporting period and independently verified three of the executions. ISW observed open-source evidence of several POW executions during this reporting period: the execution of three Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, Zaporizhia Oblast on December 27, 2023; the execution of one Ukrainian POW near Klishchiivka, Donetsk Oblast on February 9, 2024; the executions of three Ukrainian POWs near Robotyne, the execution of six Ukrainian POWs near Avdiivka, Donetsk Oblast, and the executions of two Ukrainian POWs near Vesele, Donetsk Oblast on or around February 18, 2024; and the execution of nine Ukrainian POWs near Ivanivske, Donetsk Oblast, on February 25.[3] The summary execution and mistreatment of POWs is a violation of Article 3 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.[4] The HRMMU report also details the forced Russification of Ukrainian populations in occupied areas, including the imposition of Russian political, legal, and administrative systems onto occupied Ukraine in violation of Russia’s international legal obligations as an occupying power.[5] ISW has reported at length on the specifics of Russia’s illegal occupation of Ukraine, consistent with the findings of the UN HRMMU report.[6]

Russian officials are tying the US and the West to a broader set of “terrorist” attacks against Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack, likely to intensify rhetoric about alleged Western and Ukrainian threats to generate greater domestic support for the war in Ukraine. The Russian Investigative Committee and Prosecutor General’s Office stated on March 27 that they will consider an appeal from the Russian State Duma to investigate American and Western financing and organization of terrorist attacks against Russia.[7] The Russian Investigative Committee, Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Duma Deputies that made the appeal did not explicitly reference the Crocus City Hall attack.[8] Kremlin officials have previously tied Ukraine and the West to the Crocus City Hall attack but have yet to make a formal accusation, and the Kremlin may refrain from issuing an official accusation as all available evidence continues to show that the Islamic State (IS) is very likely responsible for the attack.[9] Russian officials routinely describe Ukrainian military strikes against legitimate military targets in occupied Ukraine and Russia as terrorism and consistently claim that Western actors help organize these strikes.[10] The Kremlin likely aims to seize on wider Russian social fears and anger following the Crocus City Hall attack by portraying Ukraine, the US, and the West as immediate terrorist threats. The Kremlin likely hopes that perceptions of Ukrainian and Western involvement in the Crocus City Hall attack will increase domestic support for the war in Ukraine, and Russian officials will likely invoke a broader view of what they consider terrorism to further cast Ukrainians as terrorists and the West as a sponsor of terrorism.[11] The Kremlin may still formally accuse Ukraine of conducting the Crocus City Hall attack if it believes that these other informational efforts are insufficient to generate the domestic response it likely desires.[12]

Russian authorities are increasing legal pressure against migrants in Russia following recent Russian officials’ proposals for harsher, measures against migrant communities in response to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack. BBC News Russian Service stated that there has been a significant increase in the number of cases related to violations of the rules of entry for foreign citizens into Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack.[13] BBC News Russian Service reported on March 27 that 784 such cases have been registered since the morning of March 25, as compared with 1,106 during the entire previous week. A Russian lawyer who often works with Tajik citizens reportedly told BBC News Russian Service that over 100 people waited for a Moscow district court to hear their cases on March 25 alone and that Russian authorities are especially targeting migrants from Tajikistan during searches. BBC News Russian Service reported that representatives of the Tajik diaspora in Russia are expecting Russian authorities to conduct a large wave of deportations following the Crocus City Hall attack. A Russian insider source claimed on March 27 that unspecified actors gave the Moscow Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) an “unspoken” order to “not spare” migrants and for MVD employees to use their own judgement in the field.[14] The insider source claimed that a source suggested that Russian authorities are not preparing to conduct raids on migrant communities but will apply the “strictest measures” to migrants in “controversial situations.” Kremlin newswire TASS stated on March 27 that Russian police and Rosgvardia conducted a raid at the Wildberries warehouse in Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast to check the documents of migrant workers, and Russian opposition outlet Baza reported that Russian authorities detained 21 people during the raid.[15] Several Russian ultranationalist milbloggers complained that the way Russian-language schools in Tajikistan are teaching about Russia’s historical imperial occupation of Tajikistan is discouraging Tajik migrants from integrating into Russian society, essentially blaming migrants for the alienation that Russian society subjects them to.[16] Select Russian officials recently called for the introduction of several anti-migrant policies, which Russian authorities are unlikely to enact given Russia’s reliance on migrants for its force generation and labor needs.[17] Russian authorities may continue the practice of raiding migrant workplaces and increase crackdowns at border crossings to temporarily placate emotional cries for retribution following the March 22 attack as the Kremlin continues to develop a cogent and practical response.

Key Takeaways:

  • The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) released its 38th report on the human rights situation in Ukraine on March 26, confirming several of ISW’s longstanding assessments about Russia’s systematic violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in occupied territories and towards Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs).
  • Russian officials are tying the US and the West to a broader set of “terrorist” attacks against Russia following the Crocus City Hall attack, likely to intensify rhetoric about alleged Western and Ukrainian threats to generate greater domestic support for the war in Ukraine.
  • Russian authorities are increasing legal pressure against migrants in Russia following recent Russian officials’ proposals for harsher, measures against migrant communities in response to the March 22 Crocus City Hall attack.
  • Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Avdiivka and southwest of Donetsk City on March 27.
  • Russian Storm-Z personnel continue to complain about their poor treatment by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the MoD tries to posture efficacy in its force generation and social benefit allocation system.

 

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

  • Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
  • Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
  • Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign
  • Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
  • Russian Technological Adaptations
  • Activities in Russian-occupied areas
  • Ukrainian Defense Industrial Base Efforts
  • Russian Information Operations and Narratives
  • Significant Activity in Belarus

 

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Positional engagements continued along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in this area. Ukrainian and Russian sources stated that positional engagements continued northeast of Kupyansk near Synkivka and Lake Lyman; southeast of Kupyansk near Ivanivka; west of Kreminna near Terny and Yampolivka; and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[18] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced near Terny, but ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[19] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated that elements of the Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz “Aida” detachment are operating near Bilohorivka.[20]

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck Kharkiv City with a D-30 universal joint glide munition (UMPB), a guided glide bomb, on March 27.[21] Ukrainian officials noted that the strike was the first Russian glide bomb strike against Kharkiv City since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022.[22] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Synehubov stated that the UMPB D-30 has a range of up to 90 kilometers and that Russian forces can launch the bomb from aircraft or ground-based Smerch multiple rocket launch systems (MLRS).[23] Russian forces struck Myrnohrad, Donetsk Oblast with three UMPB D-30SN guided glide bombs on March 10.[24]

 

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces reportedly advanced west of Bakhmut, although there were no confirmed changes to the frontline in the area on March 27. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced west of Bakhmut along a railway line and a section of the O0506 (Khromove-Chasiv Yar) highway by 1.15 kilometers in depth and 1.85 kilometers in width.[25] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the 98th Airborne (VDV) Division are advancing near Ivanivske and are within 500 meters of the city limits of Chasiv Yar (west of Bakhmut).[26] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu credited elements of the Russian 102nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) with seizing Ivanivske on March 24, although ISW has yet to observe visual evidence confirming that Russian forces have seized Ivanivske.[27] Positional fighting continued northeast of Bakhmut near Vesele; northwest of Bakhmut near Bohdanivka; west of Bakhmut near Ivanivske; southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka and Andriivka; and south of Bakhmut near Shumy and Pivdenne.[28] A Ukrainian military observer reported that Russian forces have intensified transfers of equipment and personnel along ground lines of communication (GLOCs) through Kadiivka, Pervomaisk, and Popasna (all east of Bakhmut), but did not specify the destination of these transfers.[29] Kadiivka, Pervomaisk, and Popasna all lie along the T0504 Luhansk City-Bakhmut highway that runs directly from the Russian rear in occupied Luhansk Oblast into Bakhmut, however.

 

Russian forces recently advanced west of Avdiivka amid continued positional fighting in the area on March 27. Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within Berdychi (northwest of Avdiivka) and in Orlivka (west of Avdiivka).[30] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces entered Semenivka (northwest of Avdiivka) and are attacking Ukrainian positions within the settlement but that Ukrainian forces are actively counterattacking in the area.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 200 meters west of Orlivka on the western bank of the Durna River, 200 meters west of Tonenke (west of Avdiivka), 200 meters in the direction of Umanske (west of Avdiivka), 300 meters south of Tonenke towards Pervomaiske (southwest of Avdiivka), and 100 meters south of Nevelske (southwest of Avdiivka).[32] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims. Positional fighting continued northwest of Avdiivka near Berdychi and Semenivka; west of Avdiivka near Orlivka, Tonenke, and Umanske; and southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane, Nevelske, and Pervomaiske.[33]

 

Russian forces recently advanced southwest of Donetsk City amid continued positional fighting west and southwest of Donetsk City on March 27. Geolocated footage published on March 27 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced within central Novomykhailivka (southwest of Donetsk City).[34] Positional fighting continued west of Donetsk City near Heorhiivka and Krasnohorivka and southwest of Donetsk City near Novomykhailivka and Pobieda.[35] Elements of the Russian 5th Motorized Rifle Brigade (1st Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC]) are reportedly operating near Krasnohorivka.[36]

 

Positional engagements continued south of Velyka Novosilka near Staromayorske and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on March 27.[37]

 

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Positional engagements continued in western Zaporizhia Oblast on March 27, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline. Positional engagements continued near Robotyne, near Mala Tokmachka (northeast of Robotyne), northeast of Novoprokopivka (south of Robotyne), and northwest of Verbove (east of Robotyne).[38] Elements of the Russian 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) reportedly continue operating within Robotyne.[39]

 


Positional engagements continued in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast, including near Krynky, on March 27.[40]

 

Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of March 26 to 27 and on March 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 13 Shahed-136/131 drones from Kursk Oblast and that Ukrainian forces shot down 10 drones over Kharkiv, Sumy, and Kyiv oblasts on the night of March 26 to 27.[41] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast.[42] Ukrainian Kharkiv Oblast Head Oleh Synehubov stated that a Russian Kh-35U subsonic anti-ship cruise missile struck Kharkiv City on the morning of March 27.[43] Ukraine’s Eastern Air Command reported that Ukrainian forces shot down an unspecified Russian cruise missile over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on March 27.[44] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces struck an industrial enterprise in Mykolaiv City with an Iskander-M ballistic missile on the afternoon of March 27.[45]

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Colonel Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces have stored “several dozen” Zircon missiles in military facilities in occupied Crimea.[46] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Major Ilya Yevlash stated that Ukrainian air defense systems, such as Patriot and SAMP/T systems, can intercept Zircon missiles when they slow down to about 3,700 kilometers per hour on approach to a target.[47]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian Storm-Z personnel continue to complain about their poor treatment by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as the MoD tries to present the efficacy of its force generation and social benefit allocation system. Russian opposition outlet Mobilization News posted a video appeal from Storm-Z fighters from Kaluga Oblast on March 27 wherein one fighter claimed that after signing contracts with the Russian MoD, Russian command sent a Storm-Z unit of 230 people to the frontline, of whom only 38 survived combat.[48] The Storm-Z fighter complained that he has been unable to receive combat veteran status or promised payments from the Russian authorities for his service.[49] Mobilization News released another video on March 27 wherein relatives of killed and wounded Storm-Z fighters complain to Russian President Vladimir Putin that Russian authorities have not issued the Storm-Z fighters combat status or granted payments in the event of their death or injury in Ukraine.[50] The relatives of the Storm-Z fighters blamed the Russian MoD and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for the poor treatment and lack of benefits for Storm-Z fighters. The Russian MoD relies heavily on Storm-Z recruits from penal colonies to carry out costly infantry-led frontal assaults against Ukrainian positions and is very unlikely to address complaints concerning their poor treatment. The Russian MoD claimed on March 27 that it is issuing electronic combat veteran certificates and streamlining and digitizing the process for veterans to obtain payments and social benefits — but these privileges evidently do not apply evenly to all personnel who have signed contracts with the Russian MoD.[51]

Russian news outlet Vedemosti reported that US-sanctioned Russian company Baikal Electronics is struggling to domestically package semiconductor chips to produce processors and that over half of its domestically produced processors are defective.[52] Vedemosti reported that Baikal Electronics began to experiment with domestically packaging chips in Russia at the end of 2021 and that outdated equipment and a lack of experienced employees caused the large amount of processor defects.

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russian drone developer Albatross LLC told Kremlin newswire TASS that Russian forces used the Albatross M5 long-range reconnaissance drones to guide aviation and artillery strikes while repelling recent pro-Ukrainian Russian raids into Belgorod Oblast.[53] Albatross LLC noted that the modernized Albatross M5 drone has a maximum range of 60-80 kilometers.

Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti reported that Russian T-72B3, T-72B3M, T-80BVM, and T-90M tanks operating in Ukraine use Reflex-M guided weapon systems with the Invar-M/M1 anti-tank guided missiles to strike Ukrainian and Western-made vehicles.[54]

Ukrainian Defense Industrial Efforts (Ukrainian objective: Develop its defense industrial base to become more self-sufficient in cooperation with US, European, and international partners)

ISW is not publishing coverage of Ukrainian defense industrial efforts today.

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine today.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian officials are weaponizing international responses to the Crocus City Hall attack to accuse the West of espousing Russophobic policies and to baselessly blame Ukraine of involvement in the attack. Russian Ambassador to Austria Dmitry Lyubinsky claimed on March 27 that while the Austrian government reacted to the Crocus City Hall attack, it did not use the words “terrorist attack” or condemn the attack.[55] Lyubinsky accused Austria of having “taken a very special position in its hypocrisy” and a “daze of permissiveness” towards Ukraine and reiterated the Kremlin narrative baselessly connecting Ukraine to the attack. Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reported that Russia has received 24-hour non-stop words of support from around the globe following the attack, but immediately pivoted to accuse Ukraine of involvement in the attack and blame NATO members of monopolizing the global fight against terror.[56]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Nothing significant to report.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

 


[1] https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2024-03-26%20OHCHR%2038th%20Periodic%20Report.pdf

[2] https://ukraine.un.org/en/264368-un-says-russia-continues-torture-execute-ukrainian-pows

[3] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-10-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-january-3-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-20-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-27-2023

[4] https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/geneva-convention-relative-treatment-prisoners-war

[5] https://ukraine.un.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/2024-03-26%20OHCHR%2038th%20Periodic%20Report.pdf

[6] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/24-210-01%20ISW%20Occupation%20playbook.pdf

[7] https://t.me/tass_agency/240300 ; https://t.me/astrapress/52521 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240322

[8] https://ria dot ru/20240327/rassledovanie-1936142056.html ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/27/deputaty-gosdumy-potrebovali-ot-sk-rassledovat-akty-terrorizma-kotorye-ssha-sovmestno-so-stranami-nato-i-spetssluzhbami-ukrainy-osuschestvlyayut-v-rossii

[9] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032424 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032524 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032624

[10] https://t.me/tass_agency/239253%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar020624%C2%A0;%C2%A0https://isw.pub/UkrWar031824%C2%A0; https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-calls-ukrainian-attack-belgorod-terrorism-promises-more-strikes-2024-01-01/ ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024 ; https://isw.pub/RusCampaignOct10

[11] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[12] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032324

[13] https://t.me/bbcrussian/62850

[14] https://t.me/vchkogpu/47045

[15] https://t.me/bazabazon/26432 ; https://t.me/bazabazon/26440 ; https://meduza dot io/news/2024/03/27/politsiya-i-rosgvardiya-priehali-s-reydom-na-sklad-wildberries-v-podmoskovnoy-elektrostali-u-rabotnikov-proveryayut-dokumenty-nekotoryh-uvozyat-v-voenkomat ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240303 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240290

[16] https://t.me/rybar/58588 ; https://t.me/notes_veterans/16295 ; https://t.me/historiographe/12011 ; https://t.me/voenacher/63252

[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-26-2024 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-24-2024

[18] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37036 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/17835 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025

[19] https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702

[20] https://t.me/RKadyrov_95/4620

[21] https://suspilne dot media/714544-zelenskij-zminiv-sekretara-rnbo-zvit-oon-sodo-stracenih-ukrainskih-polonenih-763-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1711553688&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[22] https://suspilne dot media/714544-zelenskij-zminiv-sekretara-rnbo-zvit-oon-sodo-stracenih-ukrainskih-polonenih-763-den-vijni-onlajn/?anchor=live_1711553688&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps; https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[23] https://armyinform dot com.ua/2024/03/27/boyeprypas-yakym-rosiyany-vdaryly-po-harkovu-mozhe-letity-na-vidstan-do-90-km-oleg-synyegubov/

[24] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031024

[25] https://t.me/RVvoenkor/64758; https://t.me/basurin_e/10068 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13845

[26] https://t.me/rusich_army/13845

[27] https://t.me/mod_russia/37029 ; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-23-2024

[28] https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37051 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16170 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/13845 ;

[29] https://t.me/samotniyskhid/4868

[30] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4888; https://t.me/kultshturmovika_ukraine/1773 ; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4889; https://t.me/c/1595839251/3625; https://x.com/GeoConfirmed/status/1772981767139430744?s=20

[31] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38373 ; https://t.me/negumanitarnaya_pomosch_Z/16183 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8724 ; https://t.me/rybar/58575

[32] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8720

[33] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37051 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8720 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8702 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55225

[34] https://t.me/tivaz_artillery/3650; https://t.me/creamy_caprice/4893

[35] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025 ; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118101 ; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/55225

[36] https://t.me/boris_rozhin/118105

[37] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37044 ; https://t.me/mod_russia/37052 ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl

[38] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02Lh7wn9dDbMDZcCSUP4kHDoHuABYPPUB5vnfakuyQw21x2MKXQ1fcsLqAgYeuSQVWl ; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7591 ; https://t.me/rybar/58575 ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8715 ; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/8692 ; https://t.me/wargonzo/19025

[39] https://t.me/batalyon15/4045

[40] https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02rxTJAPqhSGh5mqY7C4XDTQiRjiVX25K4Tmx6tT6GCypPhjw8tmKBZAmRa5jaETbGl; https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid02ReTBwNLG8czu42xB89ixKbv1WzZE2LqsgMcXwngSeHHpRjAXoaR3esPk1eCxZiZ8l ; https://t.me/dva_majors/38313

[41] https://t.me/kpszsu/12330

[42] https://t.me/pgo_gov_ua/22717 ; https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/vijska-rf-atakuvaly-izyum-shahedamy-poshkodzheno-gimnaziyu-poraneno-ohoronczya/ ; https://t.me/synegubov/8827?single

[43] https://t.me/synegubov/8827

[44] https://www.facebook.com/pvkshid/posts/pfbid0LGmUtBDdzmxud8zZ23FDoN8eKarYJkLS6YrsSUzB62HVo7uSrXWhxPxnnzAhuSUyl

[45] https://t.me/mykolaivskaODA/8840 ; https://t.me/dsns_mykolaiv/4948 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/7600

[46] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/u-sylah-oborony-povidomyly-pro-kilkist-rosijskyh-czyrkoniv-u-krymu/

[47] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2024/03/27/u-povitryanyh-sylah-povidomyly-pro-sposoby-zbyttya-rosijskyh-czyrkoniv/

[48] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18111

[49] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18111

[50] https://t.me/mobilizationnews/18114

[51] https://t.me/mod_russia/37031

[52] https://www.severreal.org/a/bolshe-poloviny-rossiyskih-protsessorov-baykal-okazalis-brakovannymi/32879476.html ; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/technology/articles/2024/03/26/1027924-razrabotchik-protsessorov-baikal-lokalizuet-odin-iz-etapov-proizvodstva

[53] https://t.me/tass_agency/240240 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240241 ; https://t.me/tass_agency/240268

[54] https://ria dot ru/20240327/rakety-1936068479.html

[55] https://t.me/RusBotWien_RU/4869

[56] https://t.me/MID_Russia/38112