By Jonathan Mautner
Russia shifted the focus of its
air campaign from northwestern to eastern Syria from January 14 – 25 in support
of pro-regime forces vying to repel a major ISIS offensive against Deir ez Zour
City. Prior to the start of that offensive, however, Russia conducted
aggressive air operations against opposition terrain in southern Idlib and western Aleppo Provinces
from January 12 – 13, continuing to flout the nationwide ‘ceasefire’
agreement that Russia brokered with Turkey and Iran on December 28. These
operations demonstrate Russia’s commitment to set conditions for pro-regime
forces to clear the suburbs of Aleppo City and thereby strengthen their hold
over Syria’s largest urban center. Then, on January 14, ISIS mounted an
offensive against pro-regime forces in Deir ez Zour City, severing the
pro-regime ground
line of communication linking regime-held districts in the western half
of the city to the Deir ez Zour Military Airport two days later. In
response to the jihadist group’s gains, Russia conducted heavy waves of
airstrikes against ISIS in Deir
ez Zour City and its environs
from January 14 – 17, intensifying
its operations even further from January 18 – 25 amidst concerted
pro-regime ground efforts to relieve the besieged airport. In
support of those efforts, Russian Tu-22 strategic
bombers conducted airstrikes against ISIS in Deir ez Zour Province after
taking off from Russia and transiting Iraqi and Iranian airspace on January 21
and 23 – 25, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense. Meanwhile, Russian
warplanes also targeted ISIS sanctuaries in eastern
Homs and Hama
Provinces, including the city of Palmyra. The dramatic surge in Russian
airstrikes against ISIS, however, does not suggest that Russia can be a
reliable partner for the U.S. against Salafi-jihadist groups. Rather, the surge
reflects Russia’s strategic interest in bolstering the claim of Syrian
President Bashar al Assad over all of Syria and maintaining a foothold in the
Euphrates River valley from which to launch future operations into western
Iraq. Although the ISIS offensive precipitated a shift in the focal point of
the Russian air campaign in Syria, that shift will be a temporary one. Once
militarily practicable, Russia will renew its air operations against the
acceptable opposition in northwestern Syria in order to further constrain U.S.
options for engagement in the Syrian Civil War.
The ISIS offensive in Deir ez Zour
City coincided with a Russian Ministry of Defense announcement that Russia and
Turkey conducted their first “joint
air operation” against ISIS in the suburbs of al Bab in northern Aleppo
Province on January 18, but Russia will not make a long-term investment in the
defeat of ISIS in northern Syria, either. Russian warplanes actually began
targeting al Bab and its environs in advance of the announcement, conducting
airstrikes against the nearby town
of Tadef on January 13 and the city
itself on or around January 16 – 17. Meanwhile, the U.S.-led anti-ISIS
coalition began
airstrikes in support of Turkish-backed operations against ISIS in al Bab,
conducting no fewer than four
strikes near the city from January 16 – 17. The failure of Turkish and
Turkish-backed forces to make significant gains near al Bab during this period,
however, suggests that Russia will not allocate the air assets necessary to
confer a decisive military advantage to the Turkish-led Operation Euphrates
Shield (OES). In striking al Bab, Russia aims to exploit Turkey’s
condemnation of the U.S. for failing to provide more timely support to OES
and thereby exacerbate the rift between the two NATO allies, all at a minimal
investment of military assets and while claiming credit for counter-terrorism
operations. Russia likely also sortied strategic bombers against ISIS in Deir
ez Zour Province and falsely
claimed coordinated airstrikes with the U.S. against ISIS in al Bab on
January 22 to highlight its ostensible value to the anti-ISIS campaign to the
new U.S. administration. Whatever the effectiveness of its anti-ISIS air operations
in the short-term, Russia’s reactionary response to ISIS in Deir ez Zour City
and its opportunistic targeting of the jihadist group in al Bab demonstrate
that Russia will prioritize its own strategic objectives over the defeat of Salafi-jihadist
threats in the long run.
The following graphic depicts ISW’s assessment of Russian airstrike locations based on reports from local Syrian activist networks, statements by Russian and Western officials, and documentation of Russian airstrikes through social media. This map represents locations targeted by Russia’s air campaign, rather than the number of individual strikes or sorties.
High-Confidence Reporting. ISW places high confidence in reports corroborated by documentation from opposition factions and activist networks on the ground in Syria deemed to be credible that demonstrate a number of key indicators of Russian airstrikes.
Low-Confidence Reporting. ISW places low confidence in reports corroborated only by multiple secondary sources, including from local Syrian activist networks deemed credible or Syrian state-run media.